Current State
of the Water System
By Michael
Hughes and Bill Wenstrom
October 5,
2001
Summary
By Bill Wenstrom
On March 17, 2001 SFTR property owners met to discuss more than a year of inactivity in moving the project forward. Consensus of the participants identified eight specific activities to be implemented by the newly reconstituted “Water Committee.” Among them was involvement of OPEC’s bonding company in formulating a completion plan for the project.
The Water Committee sent a letter to the company in April or early May. Apparently prompted by the company, Don Cannella of OPEC asked Michael Hughes in July to accept a job resolving the problems.
Michael first created a document called “Completion Agreement,” defining OPEC’s responsibility. As a show of good faith while it was under review by Metro and Metro’s attorney, OPEC paid Michael to evaluate the leak rate and contamination of the supply pipeline from Trinidad to the ranch, and perform other work.
On August 10, the committee met with Cannella to finalize the agreement. The committee and Cannella were unable to compromise on key provisions. Cannella suspended Michael’s work and reclaimed OPEC’s tools, vehicle, and backhoe.
With the notable exceptions of writing a letter and publishing meeting minutes, the committee in the last six months failed to complete any of the seven other specific activities identified on March 17.
Continuing inaction means that more testing, repair, and then commissioning is impossible in the near and not-so-near future. Another group of uninformed and inexperienced volunteers, who may mean well, is unable to provide a service desired by many property owners. The system remains inoperable and incapable of generating revenue for minimal system maintenance.
Meanwhile, Metro’s financial position is precarious. Metro (and the Water or Utility Committee prior to forming Metro) spent almost all of the more than $700,000 in special water and telephone assessments collected (and not spent) by the developer and the $1.8 million financed through tax-exempt bonds.
Some owners continue to pay $31 per month per lot to retire the bond debt. Despite prepayments, more than half the lots on the ranch are in arrears. Owners may be withholding payment pending a responsible, factual, and realistic explanation of this deplorable situation.
Background
By Michael Hughes
In August 1999, I was asked as an interested resident of the ranch to "help out with the water system.” I initially spent several months attending meetings of the Water Committee, composed largely of the Metro District directors, to learn about the status of the project. It was then at least a year old.
These meetings were poorly publicized. No minutes documenting decisions made there were recorded nor were any other reports concerning the meetings circulated to POA or Metro District members as far as I know.
During the last few months of active construction from February to May 2000, I was the daily companion of the OPEC foreman, Jeff Pinello. OPEC (Outside Plant Engineering Consultants) was the prime construction contractor for the system. I also spent many hours with the engineer, Vern Jaschke of High Plains Engineering, who developed the overall design and construction specifications for the project. I also worked with the representative of the pump contractor, David Kesler of Fluid Automation Systems. From these people, personal research, and contacts with other water system professionals, I gained knowledge of the theoretical and the practical aspects of small rural water systems.
With this knowledge and the help of Mr. Jaschke, Mr. Kesler, and other interested ranch residents, I was able to operate the pumping system in August 2000. We filled all three tanks and the supply lines, and attempted to evaluate the system’s status, including detecting numerous leaks.
I worked as OPEC’s foreman on leak detection and repair from September 8, 2000 until October 17, 2000 for which I was paid. During this time, I supervised OPEC’s sub-contractor, Alan Castillo Excavation. In September 2000, an OPEC employee temporarily disrupted electrical service to Pump4. Neither OPEC nor the Metro District promptly repaired the damage that rendered the pumps inoperable. On October 15, I also found Pump1 damaged by debris in the impeller. Despite being unable to operate the pumps during fall 2000, leak detection and repair continued. For example, I found a large leak in the main supply pipeline line from Trinidad to Pump1 in December. OPEC immediately repaired this leak.
I summarized leak detection and repair as Repair Log - 2000. Like other supporting documents mentioned in this report and highlighted in bold face type, copies of the repair log, other detailed records, and photos of repairs are available from me.
I verbally summarized my knowledge of the system at the annual POA meeting in October 2000. Throughout this involvement, I also identified numerous system flaws that I attribute to faulty design. Examples include failure to provide protection for the pumps, such as a strainer and ARV (air relief valve). Both could prevent damage caused by air or debris in the water lines. The pumps were also insufficiently protected from freezing.
I also identified numerous examples of faulty construction including improperly placed thrust blocks (kickers), pipe ends not fully inserted into bell joints, physical damage by backhoes to buried piping, and service taps left open prior to burial. I documented these observations in a written summary (SFTR Water System Review) dated November 5, 2000.
I wrote an additional memo to support my observations concerning the design (Engineering Problems & Solutions) in December 2000 and modified it in March 2001. In February 2001, Pump1 froze (Frozen Pump Report) damaging a sensitive valve within the pump enclosure. This further compounded the known problems and, in part, led to a scheduled public review meeting of the system’s status following the regularly scheduled POA board meeting on March 17.
March 17, 2001 Review Meeting
By Michael Hughes and Bill Wenstrom
On Saturday, March 17, 2001, a group of SFTR property owners met to discuss the status of the water system. Among those present were eight of nine POA Board members, one of five Metro board members, and seven other property owners (Summary of SFTR Water System Discussion, Saturday, March 17, TSJC).
During the meeting, Harriet Vaugeois read excerpts from a report on the April 15, 2000 POA Utilities Committee meeting. We summarize important issues raised in the report below because they illustrate the on-going problem. As of April 2000:
1. The pump system needed work to fill the tanks;
2. Leak testing in the Tank2/3 service area was incomplete;
3. Since testing was incomplete, additional leaks probably exist;
4. At least some of the known and unknown leaks need to be repaired;
5. The tanks must be filled and the system flushed and decontaminated;
6. An O&M Plan, possibly requiring a chlorinator, needs to be written;
7. Once functioning, the system needs to be operated for an undefined period for additional testing, debugging, and refining the O&M Plan; and
8. The system must be reviewed/approved by some regulatory agency.
In April 2000, it appeared that Metro could begin hooking-up customers only when the above were completed in more or less chronological order. This list illustrated that almost a year had passed between April 2000 and March 2001 with little change in the system’s status. Unfortunately, the above remain incomplete. So the April 15, 2000 report is nearly as valid today as it was then.
Michael Hughes read a detailed report he prepared concerning the system’s problems, proposed solutions, and the estimated cost of implementing them (Perceived Problems – Proposed Solutions, dated March 20, 2001). Open discussion then occurred.
Informal consensus of the participants identified actions to be taken as follows:
1. Secure an expert analysis of the system from a qualified water system professional or engineer;
2. If necessary, involve OPEC’s bonding company in formulating a completion plan among the contractors;
3. Set time limits on the repairs;
4. Secure adequate funding for completing and operating the system;
5. Create a plan for finding and hiring a system operator;
6. Determine who among the Metro Board would act as the General Contractor in insuring that the system is completed properly or find someone to manage the project to completion;
7. Investigate a plan for funding and maintenance that might link the water and road systems by providing a “big picture” financial overview instead of a year-by-year outlook; and
8. Provide detailed and regular information about progress to all property owners.
Note that at the time of the March 17 meeting, Pump1 had been non-functional since October 2000. Before the meeting, the Water Committee decided to install a separator and ARV there. Unfortunately, installation of the devices did not conform to their design drawings and they were not operationally tested.
More Recent Events
By Michael Hughes
Subsequent to the March 2001 meeting and after conferring with an attorney, the Water Committee sent a letter to OPEC’s bonding agent in April or early May. Neither Fluid Automation nor High Plains Engineering purchased completion bonds. The letter contended that our attempt to operate the water system last summer and fall was unsuccessful because of apparent design flaws, construction at variance with written specifications for the project, and numerous examples of poor workmanship and/or lack of construction inspection and engineering oversight. It requested immediate action to correct the situation.
Little more happened until July 3, 2001 when I met with Don Cannella, OPEC’s CEO. Apparently prompted by the bonding company, Cannella asked if I would be willing to accept a paid job as project manager to resolve the remaining problems. His request was based on my performance last year finding leaks and overseeing leak repairs that demonstrated my qualifications for the job.
In order to accomplish this task, Cannella provided a backhoe and operator, a pickup truck, payment of any reasonable expenses associated with the job, and the authority to hire whoever I needed to accomplish whatever I thought was reasonably necessary. I believe he provided these assets in a good-faith attempt to satisfy his bonding company by bringing the project to a successful completion. This despite his contention that OPEC was no longer contractually responsible for any part of the system.
On the same day, the Water Committee instructed Jaschke to operate the pumping system and fill Tank1. He bypassed the city water meter in order to increase pressure available to Pump1. I informed the Water Committee at the next meeting that I would not participate in employing illegal means to accomplish goals. Furthermore, this methodology does not indicate the true status of the pumping system since bypassing the water meter is not an acceptable operating mode.
I also then stated that the tanks needed to be empty in order to install a water meter at each for leak detection in contrast to a jury-rigged, weighted bucket, pulley, and marked board arrangement recommended to the committee by Jaschke (High Plains Engineering Drawing of Suggested Water Level Measuring Device (Temporary)).
My next assignment in July was to become familiar with the original construction contract and then to create a written document that would clearly define OPEC’s continuing responsibility. I drafted such an agreement containing all of the issues that have been raised in the past by both parties. I expected that Metro and/or the committee and OPEC would reach some mutually acceptable compromise. I e-mailed the proposed agreement (Completion Agreement- Draft) to Cannella and Jim Davis on July 11.
As a further show of good faith on OPEC’s part while the agreement was under review by Metro and Metro’s attorney, I evaluated the pipeline from Trinidad to the ranch. In Cannella’s opinion this was unnecessary since the contract for this portion of the project was clearly complete. I convinced him that the evaluation was critical to establish the viability of the main supply line, Pump1, and by extension, the rest of the water system.
On July 13, 2001 I established that the leak rate of the main supply pipeline from Trinidad to Pump1 was 8 gallons per day (City Tap to Pump #1 Leakage Report). I also conducted a water quality test on July 26 employing the services of AquaSource Inc., an independent testing company. The test revealed that the line was contaminated and needed sanitizing despite recently pumping 15,000 gallons of chlorinated city water through it. Unfortunately, this test was qualitative and did not indicate the severity of the contamination.
In anticipation of Jaschke resolving the problem with Pump1, I installed a water meter at Tank1 for leak detection and isolation. On July 30, he again unsuccessfully attempted to operate the pump, this time without bypassing the water meter. On July 31, he re-piped the station. He removed the ARV installed only a few months earlier and replaced it with a flushing valve. He then flushed 3,569 gallons of water through the valve.
On August 1, 2001 the Water Committee again assembled at Pump1 to observe Jaschke re-flush the line, expelling dirty water and entrained air. He then removed an automatic backpressure control valve, installed a manual valve, and closed this valve to render the automatic pump control valve inoperable. To compensate for disabling the pump control valve, he manually adjusted the output valve of the pumping station. To compensate for lack of an ARV, he operated the pump with the impeller air-bleeding valve open. None of these are acceptable modifications with respect to day-by-day operation of the pump.
Jaschke then declared that all of this was necessary for the pumping station to operate. He stated that the newly installed separator was the cause of the problem, the source of the dirt and air in the line, and must be removed. On the other hand, it may be that the pump had insufficient operating pressure simply because the new separator was plugged with dirt. None of the committee members or Jaschke apparently knew how to drain and clean it.
In addition to leak detection and repair, one of the key objectives of our work in late summer and fall 2000 was to run the pumps automatically. Mr. Kesler of Fluid Automation and his senior technician were then on the ranch to make what Kesler believed were final modifications to the pump relay control wiring.
When the activities of others rendered the pumps inoperable in September, Kesler left and never returned. Accordingly, the pumps were not then and never have been operated in full automatic mode. It’s highly unlikely, for example, that Pump1 will now operate automatically after Jaschke’s modifications in July and August. Without Pump1, it’s impossible to test the other five pumps in automatic mode. Therefore, it’s not feasible to circulate water in the system to protect it from freezing this winter.
On August 4, 2001 I tested the supply lines from Tank1 using the newly installed water meter at the tank and evaluated the leak rate in various portions of the Tank1 service area (Tank #1 Leakage Testing Results). I concluded that there are four major leaks in the area. Three are probably at the end of cul-de-sacs and should be relatively easily repaired. The fourth leak is probably around Cistern2. I am told that this cistern has been re-set twice in the course of construction due to settling. It is located in a soft drainage basin. That cisterns on the ranch settle, thereby severing supply and output lines, is familiar to numerous residents who have experienced the same problem with their own systems.
Also on August 4, Davis e-mailed to Cannella and myself a revision of the Completion Agreement (Completion Agreement – MD) he created based on advice from Metro’s attorney, John Mitchell. From the Metro District’s perspective, this version of the agreement preserved the intent of the original construction contract. From OPEC's perspective, this version of the agreement absolved the Metro District of any responsibility for the system’s problems and placed responsibilities on OPEC that in OPEC's opinion were inappropriate.
Specifically, OPEC insists that the system was sanitized during construction. OPEC further insists it should not be held responsible for additional sanitizing required by the system stagnating for the last nine months. Additionally, specifying an acceptable leakage rate is unrealistic in OPEC’s opinion. OPEC believes that unknown leaks occur at saddle taps.
Saddle taps were installed during the original construction phase at Metro’s direction against OPEC’s advice (Letter from OPEC to Jim Davis, December 22, 1998). OPEC recommended fusible tapping tees. Metro also chose stainless steel instead of brass saddle taps, apparently in an effort to save money. Recently excavated stainless steel saddle taps are already rusting. Lastly, OPEC believes it is not responsible for a Colorado Department of Health inspection because it was not in control of the quality of the pumping system, designed by another contractor.
At Cannella's request, I redrafted the agreement to reflect OPEC’s point of view (Completion Agreement – OPEC). Cannella also asked me to create an Arbitration Demand in anticipation of the need to invoke the arbitration provision of the original contract.
I then had piping at Tanks 2 and 3 excavated with the expectation of installing water meters there for leak testing as at Tank1. On August 8, 2001 I called Jaschke and the Metro District’s representative, Dave Olson, to request that the water in Tank1 be pumped to Tank2 in order to perform an evaluation of the piping in the Tank2 service area. This was designed as a test similar to the test I performed for the Tank1 service area. I received no response from Jaschke.
On August 10, the Water Committee met with Cannella to discuss the draft Completion Agreement. Cannella and the committee were unable to compromise on the key issues of leakage and sanitizing presented in various drafts of the Completion Agreement and discussed above. Although refusing to be held to a specific leakage rate or to assume responsibility for further sanitizing, Cannella offered to continue to pay me to find and repair as many leaks as possible. The committee refused this offer, stating instead its intent to take the situation into arbitration.
The committee then placed a conference call to Metro’s attorney, John Mitchell. Mitchell said he’d refer to the matter to his colleague, Bob Winters, an expert in contract law.
After the meeting, Olson contacted me. He informed me that the Water Committee also decided to turn off the city water tap and Tank1. I, therefore, closed the water meter valve at Tank1. Olson and I agreed that the committees' decision to turn off the city tap would be counterproductive. It would result in a need to repeat all of the work that had been done to date, and was unnecessary since the leak rate was minimal. We agreed to monitor this line to insure that no major leakage would go undetected.
As of September 24, 2001 leakage from the main supply pipeline had decreased to less than 1 gallon per day. This suggests that keeping the pipeline seals wet is the appropriate action. I recorded water use records since I began monitoring the city water meter on April 24, 2000 (Water Usage Log).
Role of the SFTR POA
By Bill Wenstrom
The Water Committee published in September a draft proposal to fund Metro’s “operating” expenses next year with POA funds (Water Committee Meeting Minutes, September 2, 2001). The proposal was later revised and presented at the September Budget Committee meeting. The Budget Committee refused to seriously consider it. Both versions of the proposal are incomplete in that they lack any explanation of income off-setting the proposed expense. Both are inaccurate. For example, neither includes any salary added costs like Worker’s Compensation Insurance for the so-called “part-time manager, ” or expenses associated with operating the manager’s vehicle. The electrical cost of pumping water, auditing, accounting, and office expenses are also ignored.
According to our Covenants, the POA exists to “promote the recreation, health, safety, and welfare” of our property owners. The POA was to fulfill its mission by, among other things, improving and maintaining the roadways and other common area, providing electrical, telephone, and water utilities, furnishing garbage pick-up, snow removal, and weed control on the common area, establishing and maintaining an emergency cash reserve, and buying liability insurance to protect against claims by others.
The POA installed primary electrical service to the ranch, including power to water wells and the Metro water system pumping stations, within budget. In fact, the “Power Account” currently has a surplus of more than $50,000.
In fall 1997, a majority of the POA membership voted to seek establishment of the SFTR Metro District that is a quasi-governmental entity. Later, owners, limited to registered Colorado voters, actually established the district by another vote. By so doing, the members shifted from the POA to the Metro District continuing responsibility for constructing the water and telephone systems. POA funds dedicated to that purpose were also assigned to Metro. Accordingly, and despite the language in the Covenants as written, the POA is no longer responsible in any manner for these utilities.
The relationship between the POA and Metro is similar in many ways to the relationship between the POA and the fire department. We’re all members of the FD by petition and/or vote of property owners. Like Metro and the POA, ranch residents volunteer service to the FD. Some donate money, sometimes to the POA and sometimes to the FD. However, it’s never assumed that the POA will step in and pay the FD’s expenses should the FD incur a financial emergency. Some here seem to believe it appropriate for the POA to do so for Metro.
In any case, the POA has never devoted sufficient funds to do what it needs to do to make the ranch, especially the roads, safe for all residents and visitors. Although allocated 65% of the total budgeted expense of the POA this year, the Road Committee has insufficient funds to resurface all roads that might benefit from resurfacing or to resurface specific roads on demand from users.
For example, to stay current with resurfacing on a desirable eight year cycle would have required spending about $143,000 this year versus the $77,000 originally budgeted for the job. The $77,000 budget was later increased to $96,000 for 2001 only by reallocating surpluses from other budget categories. While closer to the desirable number, it’s still not enough.
In fact, the cost incurred this year while resurfacing questions the POA’s ability to renew road surfaces every eight years. For example, with 83 miles of roadway, keeping current requires resurfacing about (83/8=) 10.3 miles per year. This is 73% more than the six miles permitted by the original 2001 budget.
Accordingly, both Michael (as Chair of the Road Committee) and Bill Bumstead (Chair of the Common Area Committee) again and again throughout the year strongly stressed the need to consider ways of (a) securing additional funds in the long-term to keep roads on the desirable eight year cycle, (b) finding ways to reduce the per-mile cost of road resurfacing, or (c) lowering expectations concerning the quality of roads the ranch can afford.
That the Water Committee devised no plan for long-range funding and maintenance that links the water system and roads only compounds this problem. To even consider diverting 20-25% of the POA’s proposed 2002 expense budget to Metro is ludicrous at best, and a very serious mistake at worst.
Assessment
By Michael Hughes and Bill Wenstrom
Since August 10, 2001 the committee has done no additional work on the system. The excavations at Tanks 2 and 3 to install water meters remain open. They need to be backfilled if for no other reason than they present hazards to deer and other wildlife on the ranch.
With the notable exceptions of contacting OPEC’s bonding company and writing meeting minutes, the committee completed none of the goals or actions identified as action items on March 17. Each is discussed individually below.
1. To secure an expert analysis of the system, the committee contacted two professionals according to published minutes. They are Bob Just and Clyde Young. Neither generated any written analysis available to owners.
2. Contact with OPEC’s bonding company produced no mutually agreeable completion plan between Metro and OPEC. The inability of Metro and OPEC to compromise on the outstanding issues means that the project is now in mediation or arbitration or litigation. The committee published no details on the legal aspects with the exception that the bonding company now apparently declines to participate.
3. The committee neither established a comprehensive list of needed system repairs and additions nor set any meaningful time limits on completing them. Minutes of its meetings illustrate that it took nine months simply to repair freeze damage to Pump1. A timeline of the project (Historical Timeline) illustrates lack of any real progress.
4. With the exception of a small loan from the SFTR POA, the committee arranged no additional financing for completing and operating the system. Michael earlier generated an estimate of the cost (System Completion Proposal) for discussion at the March 17 meeting. The POA loan was also based on the expectation that the funds would be spent to accomplish the first six repair projects outlined in the Completion Proposal. To date, the committee unsuccessfully undertook only the first of six repair projects. Additionally, the committee earlier this month published an incomplete, inaccurate, and possibly illegal, proposal to fund Metro operations with POA funds.
5. The committee has no system operator despite several references in the minutes of various meetings. The June 27, 2001 minutes state that Dave Olson accepted the job and that compensation would be finalized in the next week or so. There is no further mention of this arrangement. Mr. Olson since resigned.
6. The committee failed to acknowledge any responsibility by Metro for the system’s current problems, determine whom among the Metro Board will act as the General Contractor in insuring that the system is completed properly, or find someone else to act as a project manager to get it completed.
7. The committee formulated no plan for long-range funding and maintenance that might link the water and road systems.
8. The committee provided information through meeting minutes although many details are omitted.
The committee’s failure to remedy many of the outstanding engineering flaws and construction deficiencies means that more system testing, leak detection and repair, and commissioning, is impossible.
Volunteer residents of the ranch staff Metro and the various Water or Utility Committees established over the years. Volunteers involved in establishing the Metro District insist that Metro was meant to be solely a financing vehicle. Fortunately, they had financial expertise in tax-exempt bond financing. Because they knew what they were doing, the financing was successful.
Unfortunately, design, construction, and operation of the system was then handed over to another committee of volunteer ranch residents. They lacked expertise in construction management similar to that possessed by the group who got financing. They didn’t know what they were doing. The assumption that a group of inexperienced amateurs could successfully manage a complex project of this type was as flawed then as it is now. It didn’t work during design and construction and it isn’t working today.
The Water Committee reformed in March 2000 is another group of uninformed and inexperienced volunteers, who all probably mean well. However, it has proven totally incapable of taking meaningful action to provide the service expected by many property owners. The system remains inoperable and incapable of generating revenue allowing even minimal on-going system maintenance. This way of doing business must change immediately.
Meanwhile, Metro’s financial position is precarious. As he sold lots on the ranch, Charles Baldwin, then in control of the POA, originally collected in excess of $1 million via special assessment of $2,000 to $2,500 per lot for construction of a water system. He also collected funds for power ($1,500 per lot) and telephone ($300 per lot).
Some owners paid these assessments in full when closing. Others signed promissory notes to pay over time. Baldwin and then the POA Water or Utility Committee spent $200,000-$300,000 from the water fund between 1990 and 1997 building an ill-conceived system (also designed by High Plains Engineering) before forming the Metro District. Despite that, more than $700,000 remained in the water and telephone funds and was later assigned by the POA to Metro.
Obviously, this money was insufficient to complete the project. Therefore, Metro financed an additional $1.8 million through tax-exempt bonds. Each owner pays $31 per month per lot that is deposited into an escrow account from which Metro makes semi-annual payments on the principal and interest.
Like the original assessments, some owners pay the $31 coupons a year or more in advance. Despite prepayments, Metro’s latest financial statements (August 2001 Financial Reports) show that more than half the lots on the ranch are now in arrears for the coupon payments. Coupon delinquencies this year more than doubled from 104 lots at the end of January to 254 lots on August 31. In the past, most of these delinquencies were of one month and could be reasonably explained by someone simply forgetting to mail in the payment on time.
Now, short-term delinquencies of 2-6 months for the first time outnumber the delinquencies of just a month. Long-term delinquencies of greater than six months hovered around three lots for most of the year. By the end of August, that number tripled to nine. It appears as though owners are purposefully withholding coupon payments pending definitive explanation of the system’s status.
The $2.8 million or so for construction of the water system was deposited into checking and savings accounts separate from the escrow accounts for bond repayment. Metro has spent all but about $6,000. The balance of outstanding promissory notes for the original special assessments totals little more than $4,100. This money trickles in at the rate of $100 or so per month.
Metro has substantial other short-term debts to contractors and the City of Trinidad for water. Partially offsetting these are some questionable receivables. Accordingly, its total operating reserve (non-escrow assets minus liabilities) has shrunk from about +$129,500 in March 2000 to -$19,700 today based on the published financials. This is an almost $40,000 swing from the +$18,000 reserve Metro earlier predicted would be available when finally commissioning the system (Metro District Water System Operating Budget 2000).
The Water Committee needs to discontinue its uninformed and non-productive tinkering with the plumbing and concentrate of finding a source of additional funds that doesn’t involve raiding the POA account or further assessing individual property owners. The committee gave up an opportunity to spend OPEC’s money fixing leaks in August. Now they’re forced to find a source for more of their own.
Metro has yet to claim any of the $12,000 loan available from the POA. However, drawing on these funds will simply increase its short-term debt, and add to the negative operating reserve. If, as suggested by the September Water Committee minutes, Metro requires at least $34,000 to “operate” the system next year, it may need to borrow more than $12,000 from the POA. However, even after securing this money and additional funds for system additions and repair leading to commissioning, Metro will require more money after commissioning just to pay recurrent monthly bills while signing up customers and beginning to generate revenue.
Should any property owner desire a copy of any of the supporting documents mentioned in this report, please contact Michael Hughes (m.r.hughes@mindspring.com or 719-845-4080).